- 12 Ιουν 2018, 19:37
#516280
Το βρήκα ψάχνοντας κάτι που συζητούσα με ένα συνάδελφο (αυτός θα ψηφίσει ΝΔ λέει, θεωρεί πως το κακό στην χώρα το έκανε η ΠΑΣΟΚάρα μόνον και η ΝΔ είχε γενικώς καλές προθέσεις.... 
).
http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_867.pdf
Moreover, the first fiscal adjustment program allowed financial corporations abroad to unload a
significant part of the stock of Greek public debt they held at the beginning of the crisis. Around
half of this debt was bought at the time by the Greek domestic sector, mostly banks. The effect of
the subsequent 2012 debt restructuring on the balance sheets of Greek banks was higher than it
would have otherwise been. In turn, that required more public borrowing for the bank
recapitalization that took place in 2013 and contributed further to the increase in the public debt.
In other words, to a certain extent the adjustment program of Greece bailed out the big financial
institutions abroad—mainly in Europe—that held the lion’s share of the debt at the beginning of
the crisis. This dimension of the Greek bailout was confirmed in a recent evaluation of the Greek
program by the IMF (2015). The IMF justifies its involvement in the Greek program without an
upfront debt cancellation because of the “risks of systemic international spillovers” and “contagion”
επίσης, λίγο παρακάτω:
It is also important to note that the loans to the Greek government during the crisis period have
almost in their entirety flowed back to the foreign creditors of the country and have been used for
the recapitalization of the banks. In the previous section we explained that the net total size of the
loans to Greece from the two first adjustment programs was €215.9bn, with €183.9bn coming
from European sources and the remaining €32bn from the IMF. A recent paper by Rocholl and
Stahmer (2016) examines where these funds were directed. As we show in figure 5, they
estimate that €86.9bn (or 40.3% of the total loans) was used for repayment of the debt, €52.3bn
(or 24.2%) for interest payments, €37.3bn (or 17.3%) for the recapitalization of the Greek banks,
and €29.7bn (or 13.8%) for the private-sector involvement (PSI) sweetener when the debt was
restructured in 2012. It follows that out of the total loans of €215.9bn, only €9.7bn, a mere 4.5%,
was used to cover actual primary deficits (other than those related to the recapitalization of the
banks). These numbers, in conjunction with the discussion in the previous paragraph, testify to
the fact that the Greek adjustment programs have served as a—direct or indirect—bailout of the
foreign creditors of the country (the private and the official sector) as well as the domestic
banking sector.
Αλλά είπαμε, φταίει που δεν εφαρμόσαμε τα σωστά μέτρα και δεν είχαμε πρόγραμμα... Αν είχαμε, θα είχαμε διορθώσει τα "λαθάκια" του ΔΝΤ και της Ευρώπης...
).http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_867.pdf
Moreover, the first fiscal adjustment program allowed financial corporations abroad to unload a
significant part of the stock of Greek public debt they held at the beginning of the crisis. Around
half of this debt was bought at the time by the Greek domestic sector, mostly banks. The effect of
the subsequent 2012 debt restructuring on the balance sheets of Greek banks was higher than it
would have otherwise been. In turn, that required more public borrowing for the bank
recapitalization that took place in 2013 and contributed further to the increase in the public debt.
In other words, to a certain extent the adjustment program of Greece bailed out the big financial
institutions abroad—mainly in Europe—that held the lion’s share of the debt at the beginning of
the crisis. This dimension of the Greek bailout was confirmed in a recent evaluation of the Greek
program by the IMF (2015). The IMF justifies its involvement in the Greek program without an
upfront debt cancellation because of the “risks of systemic international spillovers” and “contagion”
επίσης, λίγο παρακάτω:
It is also important to note that the loans to the Greek government during the crisis period have
almost in their entirety flowed back to the foreign creditors of the country and have been used for
the recapitalization of the banks. In the previous section we explained that the net total size of the
loans to Greece from the two first adjustment programs was €215.9bn, with €183.9bn coming
from European sources and the remaining €32bn from the IMF. A recent paper by Rocholl and
Stahmer (2016) examines where these funds were directed. As we show in figure 5, they
estimate that €86.9bn (or 40.3% of the total loans) was used for repayment of the debt, €52.3bn
(or 24.2%) for interest payments, €37.3bn (or 17.3%) for the recapitalization of the Greek banks,
and €29.7bn (or 13.8%) for the private-sector involvement (PSI) sweetener when the debt was
restructured in 2012. It follows that out of the total loans of €215.9bn, only €9.7bn, a mere 4.5%,
was used to cover actual primary deficits (other than those related to the recapitalization of the
banks). These numbers, in conjunction with the discussion in the previous paragraph, testify to
the fact that the Greek adjustment programs have served as a—direct or indirect—bailout of the
foreign creditors of the country (the private and the official sector) as well as the domestic
banking sector.
Αλλά είπαμε, φταίει που δεν εφαρμόσαμε τα σωστά μέτρα και δεν είχαμε πρόγραμμα... Αν είχαμε, θα είχαμε διορθώσει τα "λαθάκια" του ΔΝΤ και της Ευρώπης...
) και θα ήταν όλα πρίμα. Και φυσικά να ψηφίζαμε και σωστά! 
Οι νοικοκυραίοι όμως θα κάνουν like στην κάλπη! 
